What Conflicts Continue as Russia Moves to Dominate Again Location of Europe and the Caucasus

Russia's Possible Invasion of Ukraine

CSIS Briefs

January 13, 2022

The Effect

If peace talks fail, the Russian war machine has several options to advance into Ukraine through northern, central, and southern invasion routes. Just a Russian attempt to seize and concur territory will not necessarily exist easy and will likely be impacted by challenges from weather, urban combat, command and control, logistics, and the morale of Russian troops and the Ukrainian population. The United states of america and its European allies and partners should be prepared for an invasion by taking immediate economic, diplomatic, war machine, intelligence, and humanitarian steps to aid Ukraine and its population and shore up defenses along the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's (NATO) eastern flank.

Introduction

Russian president Vladimir Putin continues to threaten an invasion of Ukraine with a major military buildup near the Russian-Ukrainian edge and aggressive language. Russian federation has deployed offensive weapons and systems inside hit distance of Ukraine, including main boxing tanks, cocky-propelled howitzers, infantry fighting vehicles, multiple launch rocket systems, Iskander short-range ballistic missile systems, and towed artillery, equally highlighted in Figures 1a and 1b. Putin has complemented this buildup with blunt language that Ukraine is historically part of Russia and that Kiev needs to return to the Russian fold.¹ Russian federation's threat is particularly alarming for at least two reasons. Showtime, Russia could move its pre-positioned forces into Ukraine apace. If fully committed, the Russian military is significantly stronger and more capable than Ukraine's war machine, and the Usa and other NATO countries have made it clear they will non deploy their forces to Ukraine to repel a Russian invasion. Fifty-fifty if diplomats attain an agreement, Putin has shown a willingness to dial upward—and downwardly—the war in Ukraine and threaten to expand the war, making the Russian threat persistent. Second, an invasion would mark a meaning change in international politics, creating a new "Iron Curtain" that begins along Russia's borders with Finland and the Baltic states and moves south through Eastern Europe, the Middle East, Central and Southern asia, and finally to Eastern asia along Communist china'south southern flank.

Consequently, information technology is of import to understand how Russian federation could invade Ukraine, how specific political objectives may influence an invasion programme, the challenges an invasion may face up, and what options the United States and its European partners have to answer. To help understand these dynamics, this brief asks several questions. What are Russian president Vladimir Putin'southward objectives? What armed services options does Russia have, and what might an invasion look like? How should the U.s.a. and its allies and partners reply?

The brief makes two main arguments. First, if Russian federation decides to invade Ukraine to reassert Russian command and influence, there are at least three possible axes of advance to seize Ukrainian territory: a northern thrust, possibly attempting to outflank Ukrainian defenses around Kiev by approaching through Belarus; a central thrust advancing w into Ukraine; and a southern thrust advancing across the Perekop isthmus. Second, if the United States and its European partners fail to deter a Russian invasion, they should back up Ukrainian resistance through a combination of diplomatic, military, intelligence, and other means. The United States and its European partners cannot allow Russia to annex Ukraine. The West's appeasement of Moscow when information technology annexed Crimea in 2014 and so orchestrated an insurgency in Eastern Ukraine only emboldened Russian leaders. In addition, Russian annexation of some or all of Ukraine would increase Russian manpower, industrial capacity, and natural resources to a level that could make information technology a global threat. The United States and Europe cannot make this error again.

The balance of this cursory is divided into three main sections. First, it examines Russian political objectives. Second, the brief analyzes Russian armed services options. Third, information technology explores options available to the United States and its allies and partners.

Figure 1a: Russian Military Buildup near Yelnya, Russia

Figure 1b: Close-Upwardly of Russian War machine Buildup near Yelnya, Russia

Russian Political Objectives

The Kremlin wants what it says: an finish to NATO expansion, a rollback of previous expansion, a removal of American nuclear weapons from Europe, and a Russian sphere of influence. Nonetheless, Putin may accept less. The Kremlin'due south primary goal is a guarantee that Belarus, Ukraine, and Georgia volition never vest to a military or economic bloc other than the ones Moscow controls and that Russia will be the ultimate arbitrator of the strange and security policy of all three states. In essence, this conflict is about whether 30 years later the demise of the Soviet Spousal relationship, its erstwhile indigenous republics can alive as independent, sovereign states or if they yet must acknowledge Moscow as their de facto sovereign.

Ostensibly, the demand for an exclusive sphere of influence in Eastern Europe and the south Caucasus is to meet Russian security interests. The Kremlin has portrayed NATO expansion to the east equally the original sin of post-Soviet international relations with the West that now must be rectified. Facts, alternate interpretations, and the security concerns of equally sovereign nations all the same, Moscow claims that without such guarantees, it will use military force to protect its security interests.

Russian Military Options

Based on these political objectives, the Kremlin has at least six possible armed forces options:

1. Redeploy some of its ground forces away from the Ukrainian border—at least temporarily—if negotiations are successful but go on to aid pro-Russian rebels in Eastern Ukraine.

2. Transport conventional Russian troops into the breakaway regions of Donetsk and Luhansk equally unilateral "peacekeepers" and turn down to withdraw them until peace talks end successfully and Kiev agrees to implement the Minsk Accords.

iii. Seize Ukrainian territory as far westward equally the Dnepr River to use as a bargaining bit or incorporate this new territory fully into the Russia. This option is represented in Figure 2a.

4. Seize Ukrainian territory up to the Dnepr River and seize an additional belt of land (to include Odessa) that connects Russian territory with the breakaway Transdniestria Republic and separates Ukraine from whatsoever admission to the Black Sea. The Kremlin would incorporate these new lands into Russian federation and ensure that the rump Ukrainian statelet remains economically unviable.

5. Seize only a chugalug of land between Russia and Transdniestria (including Mariupol, Kherson, and Odessa) to secure freshwater supplies for Crimea and cake Ukraine'due south access to the sea, while fugitive major combat over Kiev and Kharkiv. This pick is represented in Figure 2b.

half dozen. Seize all of Ukraine and, with Belarus, announce the germination of a new tripartite Slavic union of Dandy, Niggling, and White Russians (Russians, Ukrainians, and Belarusians). This option would involve operations represented in Figure 2a every bit "stage ane," with Figure 2c representing "phase two" of this option.

Of these six options, the first two are the least likely to incur pregnant international sanctions just have limited gamble of achieving a breakthrough on either NATO issues or the Minsk Accords due to their coercive nature. All other options bring major international sanctions and economic hardship and would be counterproductive to the goal of weakening NATO or decoupling the United States from its commitments to European security.

Options three through six could achieve another goal—the devastation of an independent Ukraine—whose evolution toward a liberal democratic state has become a major source of contention among the Kremlin'south security elites. Selection iii would have Russia control a substantial amount of Ukrainian territory just still leave it as an economically viable state. Selection four leaves simply an agrarian rump Ukraine but precludes occupying its virtually nationalistic areas. Option five leaves more of Ukraine free but even so cuts its access to the bounding main and incurs fewer occupation costs. Options four and 5—seizing a belt of country from Tiraspol to Mariupol—are complicated by the fact that there is no due east-west running natural feature, river, or mountain range that could serve as a natural line of demarcation for this occupied land. The new edge forth this territory would run across countless fields and forests and be difficult to defend. Option half-dozen means occupying the entire country and dealing with the absorption of a population of 41 one thousand thousand that may resist occupation actively and passively for years. It would require an occupation force of considerable size to command the population and human the new borders with NATO countries. Ukrainians in any occupied territory can expect forced Russification that the nation experienced nether such rulers as Catherine the Great, Alexander II, Stalin, and Brezhnev.

Possible Invasion Routes

Ideological grooming of Russian club for a conflict with Ukraine has been ongoing since at to the lowest degree 2014, with Kremlin propaganda portraying Ukraine as a proto-fascist, neo-Nazi state. In July 2021, a public letter by President Putin asserted that Russians and Ukrainians are the same people and castigated Ukraine's regime for justifying independence past denying its past.² The Russian military made President Putin's commodity compulsory reading for its soldiers.³ This was followed in October by a letter in the newspaper Kommersant by Russian Security Council vice-president Dmitry Medvedev, which used antisemitic tones to delegitimize the current Ukrainian leadership as extremist, corrupt, and foreign controlled.^four

With an ideological footing for action in place, the adjacent step is to create a casus belli—justification for war—consistent with the Kremlin-manufactured epitome of Ukraine. Pretexts for an attack could range from a straightforward breakdown of security talks to a stage-managed incident similar to the provocations at Mukden, Gleiwitz, and Mainila that provided justification for Nihon'south invasion of Manchuria, Germany'south invasion of Poland, and the Soviet Spousal relationship's attack on Finland, respectively. This is why the bizarre claim of Defense Government minister Sergey Shoigu posted on the Kremlin'due south official website of American mercenaries preparing a "provocation" with chemical weapons in Ukraine is ominous and might foreshadow just the type of "incident" the Kremlin would prepare.⁵

Once in that location is a casus belli, cyberattacks will likely follow to dethrone Ukraine'south military command and control systems and public communications and electrical grids. Side by side, kinetic operations volition likely begin with air and missile strikes confronting Ukraine'south air force and air defence force systems. In one case air superiority is established, Russian footing forces would move forward, slightly preceded past special operations to dethrone further command and control capabilities and delay the mobilization of reserves by conducting bombings, assassinations, and sabotage operations.

The scheme of maneuver of a Russian military invasion of Ukraine will probable be influenced by which of the above political goals the Kremlin wishes to accomplish, the geography of the country and cities to be fought over, and the transportation routes to bring upwardly logistics. If the Kremlin wishes to practice options iii, four, or six, and taking into consideration primary geography and logistics, there are 3 likely axes of advance to seize Ukrainian territory due east of the Dnepr River, with the river as either a limit of accelerate or the showtime phase line of a larger invasion.

Northern Route: Russia could advance toward Kiev along two routes. The outset would be 150 miles by road through Novye Yurkovichi, Russian federation; Chernihiv, Ukraine; and into Kiev, Ukraine. The second would be a 200-mile thrust through Troebortnoe, Russia; Konotop, Ukraine; Nizhyn, Ukraine; and into Kiev.⁶ If Minsk were to acquiesce to the use of its road and rail networks, the Russian regular army could outflank Ukrainian defenses effectually Kiev and approach them from the rear via a 150-mile centrality of accelerate from Mazur, Belarus, to Korosten, Ukraine, and finally to Kiev.

Primal Route: Russia could likewise advance westward along three routes. The first might include a 200-mile axis that moves through Belgorod, Russian federation; Kharkiv, Ukraine; Poltava, Ukraine; and finally to Kremenchuk, Ukraine. The 2nd might include a 140-mile axis thrust through Donetsk, Ukraine to Zaporizhzhia, Ukraine; and mayhap besides another thrust from Donetsk to Dnipro, Ukraine. The 3rd might involve Russian forces advancing forth the coastline toward Mariupol, Berdyansk, and the Perekop isthmus connecting Crimea to Ukraine.

Southern Route: Russia could also advance beyond the Perekop isthmus to have Kherson and the source of freshwater for Crimea and simultaneously toward the vicinity of Melitopol to link up with Russian forces advancing along the coast of the Sea of Azov. If Russian federation was to attempt pick five, this would exist the main attack coupled with the assault along the coastline toward Mariupol and Berdyansk. Just information technology would exist hardest to sustain logistically due to the lack of a railway running along the Sea of Azov coast and the main direction of advance.

Figure ii highlights possible invasion routes. All of these routes, except the coastal i, parallel existing runway lines. This is essential since Russian army logistics forces are not designed for large-scale ground offensives far from railroads.⁷ If Russia'southward objectives include denying Ukraine future access to the sea, it will accept to seize Odessa. Some predict that this would exist accomplished via amphibious and airborne landings near Odessa, which link upwardly with mechanized forces approaching from the east. If Russia intends to conquer the entire country, its forces would need to seize Odessa (whose port facilities would ease Russian logistics) and likewise cantankerous the Dnepr River at several points to march and fight an additional 350 to 700 miles further west to occupy all of Ukraine up to its borders with Poland, Slovakia, Hungary, Romania, and Moldova.

Figure 2: Possible Russian Invasion Routes

Russian Prospects of Success

Mechanized attacks are not always as rapid as attackers hope. Two of the quickest movements of armored forces in history—German general Heinz Guderian's punch through the Ardennes and seizure of Dunkirk in May 1940, and the U.S. and coalition advance from the State of kuwait border to Baghdad in 2003—each averaged approximately 20 miles per solar day. Movement against a determined foe in winter conditions with express daylight could reduce that rate of accelerate significantly.

With enough troops, firepower, logistics, time, and national will, as well as no outside interference, Russia could grind forrard until its armed forces achieves the Kremlin's political objectives. Russia's armed services outnumbers Ukraine'due south armed services in the air and on the footing, Russia gained all-encompassing experience in conducting combined-arms operations in Syria, and the terrain favors offensive mechanized warfare. Yet, the true calculation of war machine success can only exist taken later a clash of arms begins. In addition, there are several intangibles—such as weather, urban combat, command and command, logistics, and morale—that may play a meaning role in the initial stages of a state of war.

Weather: An invasion that begins in January or Feb would have the advantage of frozen ground to support the cross-country motility of a big mechanized force. It would also mean operating in conditions of freezing common cold and limited visibility. January is usually the coldest and snowiest month of the year in Ukraine, averaging 8.5 hours of daylight during the month and increasing to x hours by February.⁸ This would put a premium on night fighting capabilities to keep an advance moving forward. Should fighting continue into March, mechanized forces would have to bargain with the infamous Rasputitsa, or thaw. In Oct, Rasputitsa turns firm ground into mud. In March, the frozen steppes thaw, and the land again becomes at all-time a bog, and at worst a sea of mud. Winter conditions is also less than optimal for reliable close air support operations.

Urban Combat: While much of the terrain east of the Dnepr River includes rural fields and forests, there are several major urban areas that a Russian mechanized force would take to either take or featherbed and besiege. Kiev has almost iii million inhabitants, Kharkiv has roughly 1.5 meg, Odessa has 1 million, Dnipro has nigh 1 million, Zaporizhia has 750,000, and even Mariupol has nearly 500,000.⁹ If defended, these large urban areas could accept considerable fourth dimension and casualties to clear and occupy. In the First Chechen War, it took Russian forces from Dec 31, 1994, to Feb nine, 1995, to wrestle control of Grozny, and then a city of less than 400,000, from a few thousand Chechen fighters.¹⁰ In the 2nd Chechen War, the siege of Grozny also took half-dozen weeks.

Therefore, the best course of activity for Russian troops would exist to bypass urban areas and mop them up later. However, Kharkiv is simply over the border from Russia and is a major road and railroad junction. If Russian forces did not control Kharkiv, it would seriously diminish their logistical capability to support a central thrust toward the Dnepr River and beyond. Furthermore, Kiev poses a similar challenge and, as the nation'southward capital, possesses neat symbolic value for whichever side holds it. Russia may be unable to avoid sustained urban combat in several major metropolitan areas (and the resulting loftier casualties) if it attempts more than a punitive incursion into Ukraine.

Command and Control: At that place is a Russian expression: "the first blini is always a mess." In the case of an invasion of Ukraine, Russian federation will be conducting its largest combined arms operation since the Battle of Berlin in 1945. The 2008 Russo-Georgian War saw just v days of combat and engaged seventy,000 Russian soldiers.¹¹ In Syria, the primary maneuver forces included Syrian ground units, with assistance from Lebanese Hezbollah, militia forces from neighboring countries such as Republic of iraq and Transitional islamic state of afghanistan, individual armed forces companies such as the Wagner Group, and Islamic republic of iran'southward Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Quds Forces. But Russia did not deploy significant numbers of conventional forces. Approximately 120,000 Russian soldiers are mobilized nigh Ukraine, with tens of thousands more ready to deploy into combat.¹² It will be a challenge for Russian command and control to first move all of these forces into their attack positions with proper march discipline. It will also be difficult for Russian federation to maintain that field of study during the attack and then that the massive amounts of vehicles and soldiers moving on a limited number of slippery and poor roads and often at night do not get ane gargantuan traffic jam.

The coordination of airborne and amphibious assaults will testify another challenge. While airborne forces could be dropped along the Dnepr River to seize crucial bridges, how long would they be able to hold out while armored forces try to reach them over wintertime roads? The aforementioned applies for amphibious forces attempting to outflank Ukrainian defenses virtually Mariupol or to seize Odessa. Black Sea hydrography and coastal topography provide few skillful landing sites for amphibious forces, and once landed, they would be hard to sustain.¹³ Without proper coordination and rapid advance of armored forces, any airborne or amphibious assault as part of the invasion could become a "bridge or beach also far" for Russian forces. Figures 3a, 3b, and 3c highlight ships from the Russian navy's Black Bounding main Fleet, including landing ships and corvettes that could be used in an amphibious set on into Ukraine.

Figure 3a: Sevastopol Bay, Crimea

Figure 3b: Close-Upward of Russian Landing Ships in Sevastopol

Figure 3c: Close-Up of Russian Maritime Vessels in Sevastopol

The Russian military likewise has express experience in coordinating a large number of aircraft that will support the ground assail. Russian air operations in Syria and Chechnya do non compare with the number of sorties that could be required in Ukraine across a front possibly several hundred miles wide. This will be the first fourth dimension since World War II that Russian federation's basis forces will face a mod mechanized opponent, and its air forces volition face up an opponent with a modern air force and air defence force system. Consequently, Russian forces will likely confront notable challenges in command, control, communications, and coordination.

Logistics: The initial attack will likely be well supported with artillery and air support, leading to several breakthroughs in Ukrainian defenses. Notwithstanding, once gainsay units expend their initial stores of ammunition, fuel, and food, the existent exam of Russian military machine strength will begin—including Russia's ability to sustain the advance of a massive mechanized force over hundreds of miles of territory. Kiev and the Dnepr River crossings are at least 150 to 200 route miles from the Russian edge, and its army volition require at least several days of fighting to accomplish them. Earlier that, they will undoubtedly accept to resupply, refuel, and supplant combat losses of men and material at to the lowest degree in one case, which will require an operational intermission.

In his article "Feeding the Conduct," Alex Vershinin argues that there are serious logistical challenges to a Russian invasion that is supposed to roll over the Baltic states in 96 hours and present the West with a fait accompli. Russia has built an splendid military for fighting near its frontier and striking deep with long-range fires. Still, Russia may have problem with a sustained basis offensive far beyond Russian railroads without a major logistical halt or a massive mobilization of reserves.^fourteen Equally the operational depth in Ukraine is far greater than in the Baltics, a Russian invasion of Ukraine could be a longer affair than some anticipate due to the time and distance to bring up supplies. If the invasion is not concluded quickly due to a combination of atmospheric condition, logistics, and Ukrainian resistance, how might this impact Russian morale?

Morale: There are two levels of morale on each side to consider: the morale of individual soldiers and the morale of each country and its people. At the individual level, will a Ukrainian soldier who believes he or she is fighting for their homeland have an advantage over a Russian soldier whose motivation for fighting may vary? For the Ukrainian nation as a whole, how stiff is their sense of a unique national identity to resist what could be a long, subversive, and bloody struggle? The answers cannot be known until the war begins. However, should war come, one factor influencing morale volition be fourth dimension. The longer the Ukrainian army resists the Russians, the greater its conviction may abound also equally its institutional knowledge of how to fight this enemy. In addition, the longer the war continues, the greater may be the level of international support and the greater the take chances of increased arms transfers to help turn the tide on the battlefield.

For Russian federation, the longer the war continues and the greater the casualties, the greater the gamble of undermining Russian morale from the level of the basic soldier to Russian gild writ large. Approximately one-3rd of Russian army consist of one-twelvemonth conscripts.¹⁵ These conscripts serve alongside professional person soldiers, or kontraktniki, under a system of hazing known as the dedovshchina. This organization is infamous for its abuses up to and including murder, which can erode unit of measurement cohesion. Additionally, heavy casualties will need quick replacements, and reservists brought to reinforce frontline units have received little recent grooming. Equally the number of professional person soldiers decreases due to casualties, and reservists and conscripts increase on the forepart line, the chance of poor unit cohesion at the soldier level will rise. If casualties and fifty-fifty defeats mountain, issues of cohesion at the forepart could be reflected in public unrest at home.

Every Kremlin ruler knows that one of the quickest ways to cease a Russian dynasty or regime is to lose a war. While early Soviet assessments of the state of war in Afghanistan were hopeful, they eventually turned gloomy. At a Politburo meeting on October 17, 1985, for instance, Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev read letters from Soviet citizens expressing growing dissatisfaction with the state of war in Afghanistan—including "mothers' grief over the dead and the crippled" and "center-wrenching descriptions of funerals."¹⁶ Every bit the Soviet state of war in Transitional islamic state of afghanistan dragged on, the costs—including in blood and money—were too high and outweighed whatsoever geostrategic benefits. Over the class of the war, virtually fifteen,000 Soviet soldiers were killed, and another 35,000 were wounded.

Russian families are sure to resent their soldiers existence used as cannon forage, and the ubiquitous presence of cell phone cameras and videos in today'southward earth volition aggrandize soldiers' complaints across their units. Therefore, the question for the Kremlin will be: the longer the state of war grinds on and society reacts to casualties and economic duress, how much are their initial objectives worth to them?

The U.S. and Western Response

A Ukraine that is willing to fight for itself is a Ukraine worth supporting. While the Ukraine of 2022 is not a perfect democracy, neither was Poland in 1939 when Britain and French republic decided that their principles and security interests made information technology necessary to describe the line against Nazi aggression along its borders. The key to disappointment Russian ambitions is to prevent Moscow from having a quick victory and to raise the economical, political, and armed forces costs past imposing economic sanctions, ensuring political isolation from the West, and raising the prospect of a prolonged insurgency that grinds away the Russian military. In this war, Russia might take the watches, simply the West and Ukraine may have the fourth dimension.

Washington's goal should be to deter Russian conventional operations in Ukraine by penalisation—non denial. Deterrence by deprival involves preventing an opponent from taking an action, such as seizing territory, by making it infeasible or unlikely to succeed. Absent a major U.Southward. and European military deployment to Ukraine, which President Biden has already ruled out since Ukraine is not a member of NATO, Ukrainian forces cannot foreclose a rapid deployment of Russian forces into Ukraine. Deterrence past punishment, still, involves preventing an opponent from taking an action because the costs—such as nuclear weapons, economic sanctions, or an insurgency—are also high. Deterrence by punishment is possible if led by the The states. The United States and its European allies and partners should publicly and privately continue to communicate to Moscow that a conventional assault on Ukraine would initiate crippling sanctions from Western countries, deepen Russia'southward political isolation from the West, and trigger a Western-backed insurgency against Russian forces in Ukraine. The The states would have to take the lead. The populations of several European countries, such as Germany and Austria, take noted that they would prefer to remain neutral in a state of war with Russia.¹⁷

If deterrence fails and Russian forces invade Ukraine, the United States and its allies and partners should bear several immediate steps:

Implement astringent economical and fiscal sanctions against Russia, including cut Russian banks off from the global electronic payment messaging system known every bit SWIFT.

Enact a Twenty-First Century Lend-Lease Human activity to provide Ukraine with war materiel at no cost. Priority items would include air defense force, anti-tank, and anti-ship systems; electronic warfare and cyber defense systems; minor arms and artillery ammunition; vehicle and aircraft spare parts; petroleum, oil, and lubricants; rations; medical back up; and other needs of a military involved in sustained combat. This help could occur through overt means with the help of U.S. military forces, including special operations, or it could be a covert action authorized by the U.S. president and led by the Fundamental Intelligence Agency.

Provide intelligence to allow Ukraine to disrupt Russian lines of communication and supply, as well as warning of airborne and amphibious attacks and locations of all major units.

Offer humanitarian support to assistance Ukraine deal with refugees and internally displaced persons. This assistance may also need to exist extended to NATO allies on Ukraine'southward borders for refugees fleeing westward.

Provide economic support, including free energy, to Ukraine and NATO allies due to the expected disruption of Russian gas flows to Europe.

Conduct public diplomacy and media broadcasts to Ukraine and globally, including in Russia, to portray accurately what is happening.

Employ diplomatic pressure level on Belarus to deny Russia access to its territory to attack Ukraine. This is critically important because Russian use of Republic of belarus' rail and road networks would threaten a strategic turning movement of Ukraine's northern flank.

Coordinate with nongovernmental organizations and the International Criminal Court to document all war crimes inflicted on the Ukrainian people and to demand redress once the state of war is over. What happened to the Syrian people should not happen again.

The United States and NATO should be prepared to offering long-term support to Ukraine'south resistance no matter what course information technology ends up taking. There has already been public contend well-nigh unconventional warfare support to Ukraine should function or all of Ukraine be occupied.¹⁸ However, this choice must exist approached with a clear understanding of what is possible to reach—and what might not be possible. Russia has historically proven adept at destroying armed resistance movements, and given plenty time, it can do so again. Its methods confronting a Ukrainian resistance will be swift, direct, and brutal.^nineteen Any sanctuary that the resistance uses, whether it is in rump Ukrainian or NATO territory, could be subject to Russian overt or covert attack. Therefore, it would require the protection of substantial conventional forces to deter Russian actions in NATO territory. Furthermore, whatever portion of Ukraine's border Russia may occupy could quickly resemble the Iron Pall of the twentieth century, featuring heavy fortifications. The Berlin Wall was a heavily-guarded physical barrier, which included anti-vehicle trenches, mesh fencing, spinous wire, a bed of nails, and other defenses. It volition exist hard to institute supply lines for a resistance across such an obstacle from any sanctuary.

While the Russians accept been adept at anti-resistance operations, they are non good at extinguishing nationalism. Any back up to occupied Ukraine should likewise include means to maintain Ukrainian'south national identity, history, and linguistic communication amidst its citizens. While armed resistance would hearken to the 1980s support provided to the Afghan mujahedin, this type of back up to preserve the Ukrainian nation would be more than in keeping with the help provided to Smooth Solidarity during its struggles for freedom.²⁰

In addition, Ukraine could potentially prevent Russia from seizing and belongings all or most of its territory with U.S. and other international aid. For example, Ukraine could keep most of its maneuver forces back far enough from initial Russian breakthroughs then that they are not encircled. As Russian forces accelerate due west, Ukraine should gain intelligence to determine Russia'due south master thrusts, conduct deep strikes against its supply lines to force them into an operational pause, and once they are stopped, envelop and counterattack them. Cities should hold out as long as possible. In the case of Kharkiv, railroads and bridges inside the city should be utterly destroyed prior to capitulation to further degrade Russian lines of advice. If the Russian military approaches the Dnepr River, its multiple dams could exist opened and low-lying areas flooded. Airborne and amphibious assaults should exist isolated immediately. Ukraine's goal should be to prevent Russia from making any significant advances before the onset of the Rasputitsa, or thaw.

Once mechanized movement is ground to a halt by mud and supply issues, airborne and amphibious pockets can be eliminated, and Ukraine will accept had plenty time to mobilize and deploy its approximately 900,000-man reserve force. Hopefully, international assistance will besides begin arriving in the course of weapons systems to preclude Russia from achieving air superiority over Ukraine and allowing it to go along to strike deep into the Russian army'southward rear to attrit reinforcements and supply lines. Every bit weeks turn into months, international economic and financial sanctions should brainstorm to have effect. The Kremlin would then be faced with a long war, on the battlefield and off it, with little end in sight.

A New Iron Curtain

The current situation bears an eerie resemblance to Soviet decisionmaking in 1979 to invade Transitional islamic state of afghanistan. In that instance, a small coterie in the Politburo fabricated the decision on their own based on faulty intelligence, poor perceptions of the international environment, overly optimistic scenarios of success, and little comprehension of the international political and economic costs they would face. A risk-versus-advantage calculation of Russia achieving its political objectives should discourage it from an invasion. Its best option would be to continue to rattle sabers, pursue diplomatic negotiations, and aid pro-Russian insurgents in Eastern Ukraine—but to refrain from a conventional invasion. However, President Putin has fabricated high-contour demands and threats that will be very hard to retreat from. Should miscalculation, emotion, and poor crunch management overcome rational calculations and lead to conventional state of war, the international mural will likely witness a dramatic change.

In his famous Iron Pall speech on March 5, 1946, British prime minister Winston Churchill spoke darkly that "a shadow has fallen upon the scenes" of Europe that pitted democratic states against authoritarian ones. "From Stettin in the Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic," Churchill remarked, "an Iron Mantle has descended across the Continent."²¹ A new Atomic number 26 Drapery would be even more dangerous—spanning Europe, the Middle East, and Asia and incorporating a new axis of disciplinarian regimes that includes Russian federation, China, Iran, and North Korea. This new dividing line would move forth Russian federation's borders with Finland and the Baltic states forth NATO'due south eastern flank; cut through Russian- and Iranian-supported countries in the Middle East and Central Asia, such as Syria and Kazakhstan; and snake along Cathay'southward borders with India through East asia to the South China Ocean. If Russia were to invade Ukraine, the U.s.a. and other European states would need to rush soldiers and materiel to NATO'south eastern flank—such as Latvia, Lithuania, Republic of estonia, and Poland—in case the Russians threatened to advance due west. Russia might also endeavor to instigate a crisis in one or more of the Balkan states to carve up American and European attending and resource. In Asia, Taiwan would probable be on alert about possible Chinese movements to take the island.

Countries such as Russia and Mainland china admire forcefulness and have niggling respect for weakness—including war machine weakness. Competition could increasingly become a struggle between rival political, economic, and military systems—betwixt authoritarian, land-controlled systems and autonomous ones. The illiberalism at the root of Chinese, Russian, Iranian, and North Korean systems is antithetical to Western Enlightenment values. They eschew freedom of the press, freedom of faith, complimentary markets, and commonwealth. As Thomas Jefferson remarked, "Freedom of religion; freedom of press; and liberty of person. . . . These principles course the bright constellation, which has gone before united states and guided our steps through an age of revolution and reformation."²² They were critical in winning the Cold War against the Soviet Matrimony, and they are just as important today.

"If the Western Democracies stand together in strict adherence to the principles of the United Nations charter, their influence for furthering these principles will be immense and no one is likely to molest them," Churchill remarked in his Fe Curtain speech. "If nevertheless they get divided or falter in their duty and if these all-important years are allowed to slip away then indeed ending may overwhelm the states all."²³ Hopefully, reason will prevail in Moscow, and Russia will not invade Ukraine. If there is an invasion, however, the United States and its allies and partners demand to exist prepared to resist tyranny.

Philip G. Wasielewski recently retired after a 31-twelvemonth career as a paramilitary operations officer in the Central Intelligence Agency. Seth G. Jones is senior vice president and manager of the International Security Program at the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C., and author most recently of 3 Dangerous Men: Russia, China, Iran, and the Rising of Irregular Warfare (W.W. Norton, 2021).

The authors give special thanks to Joe Bermudez and Jennifer Jun for their aid with satellite imagery analysis, as well equally to Jared Thompson for his outstanding research assistance. The authors too give thanks Jeeah Lee and William Taylor for their infrequent editorial and graphic pattern support.

This brief is fabricated possible past general support to CSIS. No direct sponsorship contributed to this cursory.

CSIS Briefs are produced by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), a private, tax-exempt institution focusing on international public policy issues. Its research is nonpartisan and nonproprietary. CSIS does not take specific policy positions. Accordingly, all views, positions, and conclusions expressed in this publication should be understood to be solely those of the author(s).

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Source: https://www.csis.org/analysis/russias-possible-invasion-ukraine